The Fight for Memorial Day by David R. Henderson — Antiwar.com
Posted: May 31, 2010 Filed under: Uncategorized, War Leave a comment »http://original.antiwar.com/henderson/2008/05/27/the-fight-for-memorial-day/
Krugman vs. Cato on Cutting Back Spending
Posted: May 31, 2010 Filed under: Great Depression, Keynesian Economics, Stimulus Leave a comment »http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2010/05/31/krugman-vs-cato-on-cutting-back-spending/
Memorial Day: Scourge the Lying Politicians…
Posted: May 31, 2010 Filed under: War Leave a comment »http://jimbovard.com/blog/2010/05/31/memorial-day-scourge-the-lying-politicians/
Does Being *Relatively* Poor Inflict Severe Psychological Damage?
Posted: May 31, 2010 Filed under: Equality, Poverty Leave a comment »http://cafehayek.com/2010/05/does-being-relatively-poor-inflict-severe-psychological-damage.html
“If being relatively poor were truly a devastating psychological experience for most people, Hispanics would remain in Latin America instead of immigrating to – and remaining in – the United States where, in their relative poverty here, they are “far outside the mainstream.”
Drugs Don’t Help
Posted: May 30, 2010 Filed under: Health Care, Health Insurance, Uncategorized Leave a comment »Sent to you via Google Reader
Drugs Don’t Help
In Spite of State Law, Maryland Law Enforcement Officials Still Arresting, Charging People for Recording Cops
Posted: May 29, 2010 Filed under: Police, Uncategorized Leave a comment »Sent to you via Google Reader
In Spite of State Law, Maryland Law Enforcement Officials Still Arresting, Charging People for Recording Cops
Biological Weapons Amnesia
Posted: May 29, 2010 Filed under: Uncategorized, War Leave a comment »Sent to you via Google Reader
Biological Weapons Amnesia
Geography Lessons: Correcting Sachs on African Economic Development
Posted: May 26, 2010 Filed under: Development Economics, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-easterly/geography-lessons-correct_b_208879.html
Kirzner on Self Interest
Posted: May 25, 2010 Filed under: Greed, Self Interest, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj25n3/cj25n3-6.pdf
Fashion and IP
Posted: May 25, 2010 Filed under: Intellectual Property, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://blog.mises.org/12798/this-is-a-fantastic-lecture-on-fashion-and-the-absence-of-ip/
Food Pyramid and Special Interest Groups
Posted: May 25, 2010 Filed under: Food Pyramid, Special Interest Groups Leave a comment »http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/what-should-you-eat/pyramid/
Booze Follies
Posted: May 25, 2010 Filed under: Alcohol, Uncategorized, Unintended Consequences Leave a comment »http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=MzJmYzZiYWJiNDQ4YTA1YzAzOTk5YzUzMTg2YjdjMjk%3D
Poor People and Expenditures
Posted: May 25, 2010 Filed under: Foreign Aid, Poverty, Uncategorized, Welfare Leave a comment »http://aidwatchers.com/2010/05/poor-people-behaving-badly/
http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/530
Property Rights and Racism
Posted: May 25, 2010 Filed under: Discrimination, Private Property, Race, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oknvBclbZMI
How Much is Social Capital Worth? — by John F. Helliwell, Christopher P. Barrington-Leigh
Posted: May 24, 2010 Filed under: Reciprocity, Reputation, Self-Regulation, Signaling, Uncategorized Leave a comment »Sent to you via Google Reader
How Much is Social Capital Worth? — by John F. Helliwell, Christopher P. Barrington-Leigh
Understanding Creativity — by David W. Galenson
Posted: May 24, 2010 Filed under: Entrepreneurship, Uncategorized Leave a comment »Sent to you via Google Reader
Understanding Creativity — by David W. Galenson
Taxing Guns vs. Taxing Crime: An Application of the “Market for Offenses Model” — by Isaac Ehrlich, Tetsuya Saito
Posted: May 24, 2010 Filed under: Guns, Police, Uncategorized Leave a comment »Sent to you via Google Reader
Taxing Guns vs. Taxing Crime: An Application of the “Market for Offenses Model” — by Isaac Ehrlich, Tetsuya Saito
Deals versus Rules: Policy Implementation Uncertainty and Why Firms Hate It — by Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Gita Khun-Jush, Lant Pritchett
Posted: May 24, 2010 Filed under: Regime Uncertainity, Uncategorized Leave a comment »Sent to you via Google Reader
Deals versus Rules: Policy Implementation Uncertainty and Why Firms Hate It — by Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Gita Khun-Jush, Lant Pritchett
Privatizing ABC Stores: To Your Health! | Richmond Times-Dispatch
Posted: May 23, 2010 Filed under: Alcohol, Privatization, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://www2.timesdispatch.com/rtd/news/opinion/commentary/article/ED-BOUD23_20100521-204606/346117/
Naomi Klein
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Naomi Klein, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://reason.com/archives/2008/09/26/defaming-milton-friedman/1
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9384
Division of Labour: YouTube: Interviews with Julian Simon
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://divisionoflabour.com/archives/007145.php
Daniel J. Smith
Sent Via Mobile Phone
http://www.danieljosephsmith.com
The Political Economy of Segregation
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Greed, Race, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://www.jstor.org/pss/2121814
Constraining the state’s ability to employ force: the standing army debates, 1697–99
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: National Defense, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=7666696
Britain’s Glorious Revolution of 1688 is one of the most widely studied cases of institutional change. Recent institutional analyses of the Glorious Revolution, however, have failed to address one of the central issues in political science: control of the state’s comparative advantage in violence. This paper examines this issue through analysis of the standing army debates of the late 1690s. Participants in the debates disputed whether a standing army or a militia would be the most effective institutional arrangement to guard against threats from abroad and tyranny at home. Both sides of the debate analyzed the effects of a standing army in terms of the incentives that it created for soldiers, citizens, the monarch, and foreign governments.
The origins of governments: from anarchy to hierarchy
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Government, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=7666684
We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally ‘switch’ from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society’s surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be ‘trapped’ at lower levels of technology, perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model’s main predictions.
Exit, collective action and polycentric political systems
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://www.springerlink.com/content/p45563w500042q1m/
Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School’s important contributions include the development of the concept of “polycentric” political systems and the demonstration that solutions to common-pool resource problems may be solved voluntarily by rational individuals, even in situations that resemble Prisoners’ Dilemmas. The program, however, pays little attention to how individuals’ ability to exit may affect the interaction in Prisoners’ Dilemma-like situations, for worse or better. We argue why this is a worthwhile consideration and survey results from public choice and game theory.
Foundations of the Ostrom workshop: institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance of the commons
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://www.springerlink.com/content/38g0220845507614/
This paper highlights important lessons gained from the research program of Elinor Ostrom, and demonstrates the close connection between public choice and the work on collective management of the commons for which Lin was honored by the Nobel Prize committee. Although our primary focus is on Lin’s research on self-governance and the “commons,” an overarching goal is to capture the intellectual journey of participants in the Ostrom Workshop, who continue to be guided by the inspiring examples set by Lin and Vincent Ostrom.
Is the only form of ‘reasonable regulation’ self regulation?: Lessons from Lin Ostrom on regulating the commons and cultivating citizens
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://www.springerlink.com/content/m569086318336gx2/
Elinor Ostrom, the 2009 Nobel Prize winner in economic science, has made significant contributions throughout her career to the disciplines of political economy and public choice. This article focuses on her contributions to our understanding of how rules of self-governance can produce cooperation out of situations of conflict over resource use. Through the use of a multiple-methods approach to political economy, Ostrom has demonstrated in a variety of historical circumstances and within a diversity of institutional environments how individuals can craft rules so that they can live better together in their communities and realize the gains from social cooperation under the division of labor.
PROMISE: THE NEGLECTED OBLIGATION IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=7730604
THE BROTHER-IN-LAW EFFECT
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Minimum Wage, Uncategorized, Unions Leave a comment »http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/123445602/abstract
When a firm is forced to pay abnormally high wages, hiring transfers rents. This effectively endows the employer with the ability to grant favors, and he may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production. We refer to this as the brother-in-law effect. This article analyzes its consequences. When the brother-in-law effect is due to unionization, decisions regarding both the number and type of workers employed could be inefficient; overemployment could obtain even relative to the workforce that would be employed without unionization. We also identify cases in which nepotism improves efficiency.
