Government = Anarchy

Posted: July 8, 2012 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

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Tech Firms Enslave Us?

Posted: June 3, 2012 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Monopoly, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

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The Machinery Of Freedom: Illustrated summary

Posted: April 11, 2012 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

BBC – Will & Testament: Was Jesus an anarchist?

Posted: April 10, 2012 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Religion, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/ni/2011/05/was_jesus_an_anarchist.html

Detroit’s Turn to Vigilantisim, Otherwise Called Private Justice

Posted: February 6, 2012 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Private Police, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

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Detroit’s Turn to Vigilantisim, Otherwise Called Private Justice

Are the Amish Anarchists?

Posted: October 15, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy | Leave a comment »

http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.com/2011/10/are-amish-anarchists.html

Is Regulation Essential to Stock Market Development? Going Public in London and Berlin, 1900-1913

Posted: August 21, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Development Economics, Financial Regulation | Leave a comment »

http://wigesch.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/FTP/RePEc/wso/wpaper/CEH_2011_2.pdf

Anarchism and Austrian Economics

Posted: June 24, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

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Anarchism and Austrian Economics

Resolving Problems among Neighbors in Post-Soviet Russia: Uncovering the Norms of the Pod”ezd

Posted: May 20, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Legal Systems, Polycentrism | Leave a comment »

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2011.01236.x/abstract

The article presents findings from a qualitative study of how Russians deal with neighbors who have leaked water onto them. In the Russian context, this is neither an uncommon nor a small problem. Building on US-based studies of neighborhood relations, the article lays out three alternative strategies: avoidance, self-help, and third-party intervention. The Russian participants lived in close proximity to one another and had little opportunity for exit. The study documents a strong preference for self-help, confirming the potency of the relational distance hypothesis for Russia. In contrast to their US counterparts, the Russian participants’ lack of exit did not give rise to more intense and prolonged disputes. The findings suggest that there is a strong informal norm in favor of neighbors resolving disputes among themselves and that the residents who share common entryways (pod”ezdy) work out the parameters of acceptable behavior over time. These informal norms shape Russians’ legal consciousness.

The Joker effect: cooperation driven by destructive agents

Posted: May 13, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Polycentrism | Leave a comment »

http://deim.urv.cat/~aarenas/publicacions/pdf/joker.pdf

Hayekian anarchism

Posted: May 13, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Hayek, Legal Systems, Polycentrism | Leave a comment »

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V8F-526MRX1-1&_user=10&_coverDate=05%2F31%2F2011&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=gateway&_origin=gateway&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=b53846ec33ec9f1559c65b8fc03f606b&searchtype=a

Hired Gun

Posted: May 9, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Public Goods, Self-Regulation | Leave a comment »

http://papers.nber.org/papers/w17032#fromrss

http://papers.nber.org/papers/w17033#fromrss

Rivalry and superior dispatch: an analysis of competing courts in medieval and early modern England

Posted: May 4, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Legal Systems, Polycentrism | Leave a comment »

http://www.springerlink.com/content/w684377300430433/

Anarchy / Peter Leeson

Posted: April 24, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy | Leave a comment »

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5PbLLBfiM8

A Middle East without borders?

Posted: March 6, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy | Leave a comment »

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/03/201134154351741689.html

Influenza Vaccination in Healthy Working Adults in Russia: Observational Study of Effectiveness and Return on Investment for the Employer

Posted: February 28, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, FDA, Public Goods | Leave a comment »

http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/adis/ahe/2011/00000009/00000002/art00004

Hayekian Anarchism

Posted: January 24, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

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Hayekian Anarchism

An anarchist history of the state (or the one book you should read this year)

Posted: January 9, 2011 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy | Leave a comment »

http://chrisblattman.com/2011/01/09/an-anarchist-history-of-the-state-or-the-one-book-you-should-read-this-year/

GOOD QUESTION!: What Can Government Do That Google Can’t?

Posted: October 19, 2010 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Government, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

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GOOD QUESTION!: What Can Government Do That Google Can’t?

More Gangs, Less Crime

Posted: September 7, 2010 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Private Police, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

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More Gangs, Less Crime

Anarchy and Efficient Law – David Friedman

Posted: July 28, 2010 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism | Leave a comment »

http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Anarchy_and_Eff_Law/Anarchy_and_Eff_Law.html

Stateless in Somalia, by Benjamin Powell

Posted: July 15, 2010 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

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Stateless in Somalia, by Benjamin Powell

A lecture by Professor Benjamin Powell on institutional development in Somalia. In this lecture he compares the government failure in Somalia with the spontaneous development of indigenous markets.

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Let Fake States Fail: Anarchy as a Viable Solution to Artificial States

Posted: June 30, 2010 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Development Economics, Endogenous Rules | Leave a comment »

http://athousandnations.com/

The origins of governments: from anarchy to hierarchy

Posted: May 22, 2010 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Government, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=7666684

We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally ‘switch’ from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society’s surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be ‘trapped’ at lower levels of technology, perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model’s main predictions.

Exit, collective action and polycentric political systems

Posted: May 22, 2010 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

http://www.springerlink.com/content/p45563w500042q1m/

Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School’s important contributions include the development of the concept of “polycentric” political systems and the demonstration that solutions to common-pool resource problems may be solved voluntarily by rational individuals, even in situations that resemble Prisoners’ Dilemmas. The program, however, pays little attention to how individuals’ ability to exit may affect the interaction in Prisoners’ Dilemma-like situations, for worse or better. We argue why this is a worthwhile consideration and survey results from public choice and game theory.

Foundations of the Ostrom workshop: institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance of the commons

Posted: May 22, 2010 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

http://www.springerlink.com/content/38g0220845507614/

This paper highlights important lessons gained from the research program of Elinor Ostrom, and demonstrates the close connection between public choice and the work on collective management of the commons for which Lin was honored by the Nobel Prize committee. Although our primary focus is on Lin’s research on self-governance and the “commons,” an overarching goal is to capture the intellectual journey of participants in the Ostrom Workshop, who continue to be guided by the inspiring examples set by Lin and Vincent Ostrom.

Is the only form of ‘reasonable regulation’ self regulation?: Lessons from Lin Ostrom on regulating the commons and cultivating citizens

Posted: May 22, 2010 | Author: Daniel J. Smith | Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism, Uncategorized | Leave a comment »

http://www.springerlink.com/content/m569086318336gx2/

Elinor Ostrom, the 2009 Nobel Prize winner in economic science, has made significant contributions throughout her career to the disciplines of political economy and public choice. This article focuses on her contributions to our understanding of how rules of self-governance can produce cooperation out of situations of conflict over resource use. Through the use of a multiple-methods approach to political economy, Ostrom has demonstrated in a variety of historical circumstances and within a diversity of institutional environments how individuals can craft rules so that they can live better together in their communities and realize the gains from social cooperation under the division of labor.