GSA employees joke about all the government waste that they oversee

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GSA employees joke about all the government waste that they oversee

 


Half of Obama biggest fundraisers get jobs in administration

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Half of Obama biggest fundraisers get jobs in administration

 


John F Kennedy bought 1,200 Cuban cigars hours before he ordered US trade embargo | Mail Online

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2098064/John-F-Kennedy-bought-1-200-Cuban-cigars-hours-ordered-US-trade-embargo.html

 


How Bad is Corruption? Cross-country Evidence of the Impact of Corruption on Economic Prosperity

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00653.x/abstract


Proposed FOIA Update: Government Should Be Allowed to Pretend Records Don’t Exist

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Proposed FOIA Update: Government Should Be Allowed to Pretend Records Don’t Exist

 


Exploring the Links Between Corruption and Growth

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00621.x/abstract


Stimulus Dollars Intended to Lower Utility Bills for the Disabled Go to Lawyers, Lobbyists

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Stimulus Dollars Intended to Lower Utility Bills for the Disabled Go to Lawyers, Lobbyists

 


Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments

http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.4.1274


Donors to Obama got big government contracts through Stimulus

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Donors to Obama got big government contracts through Stimulus

 


Abnormal Returns From the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives

http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol13/iss1/art4/?sending=11417


Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States)

http://www.springerlink.com/content/6p74nu14860u8w30/


Health Programs Rank High on List of Improper Payments

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Health Programs Rank High on List of Improper Payments

 


One of Obama’s Biggest Donors Now His ‘Economics Adviser’ – Publius Forum

http://www.chicagonow.com/blogs/publius-forum/2011/01/one-of-obamas-biggest-donors-now-his-economics-adviser.html

 


Inspector: Millions in improper Katrina, Rita aid not yet recovered

http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/01/03/fema.payments/


Economic growth with endogenous corruption: an empirical study

http://www.springerlink.com/content/0251327436872551/


Insider Trading is Legal for Congressional Insiders

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Insider Trading is Legal for Congressional Insiders

 


The corruption of economics: Larry Summers: neo-Keynesian aristocrat | The Economist

http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/10/corruption_economics

 


Insider Trading on Capitol Hill

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Insider Trading on Capitol Hill

 


This Bud’s Not for You

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This Bud’s Not for You

(Jonathan H. Adler)

The California Beer and Beverage Distributors is opposing a California ballot proposition that would legalize marijuana within the state. No surprise there. Some of the CBBD’s members may fear legal marijuana would compete with beer. Interestingly, the CBBD claims it is not opposed to legalization in principle, just the poor wording of this specific proposal. Josh Wright doesn’t buy it. Neither should you.

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DDBDbNOCHpE

Daniel J. SmithSent Via Mobile Phone
http://www.danieljosephsmith.com


Bribery and inspection technology

http://www.springerlink.com/content/j6068855523r7642/

The e-government movement advocates increased use of technology to improve government efficiency and reduce corruption by reducing the discretionary power of government officials. This paper studies the relationship between improvements in inspection technology within a Principal-Supervisor-Agent model, where the supervisor is an inspector who is hired by the principal to investigate the agent’s potentially illegal actions. We show that when technology increases the marginal or total productivity of the supervisor’s effort, improvements in inspection technology encourage some types of bribery. Although such technological improvements induce an equilibrium with bribery, compliance and social welfare can still rise. However, when technology and supervisory effort are sufficiently substitutable, improvements in technology may reduce compliance when bribery occurs in equilibrium even when those same technological improvements would have raised compliance in the absence of bribery. We also characterize the relationship between the principal’s socially optimal technology and the anti-corruption policy available to the principal and find that the socially optimal inspection technology may be a substitute for or a complement to the anti-corruption policy. Finally, we show that for any set of policies that optimally induces a no-bribe equilibrium, there exists another set of policies that induces an equilibrium with bribery that is pareto superior to it.


Media activity and public spending

http://www.springerlink.com/content/h39235362l040156/

Politicians seeking reelection need voters to know what they have done for them. Thus, incentives may arise to spend more money where media coverage is higher. We present a simple model to explain the allocation of public spending across jurisdictions contingent on media activity. A politician seeking to maximize the probability of reelection will shift more money to jurisdictions where an extra dollar raises more votes because a larger share of the electorate is informed about his policy. The main prediction of the model is that media activity is higher in the core areas of media markets. This implies higher spending levels there and lower spending levels in remote jurisdictions. Empirical support for this prediction is found using United States data on county-level federal grant allocation, Designated Market Areas and the location of licensed television stations.


Watchman, Who Watches Thee? Donors and Corruption in Less-Developed Countries: The Independent Review: The Independent Institute

http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=563

Daniel J. Smith
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http://www.danieljosephsmith.com


With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies? Aiding the World’s Worst Dictators: The Independent Review: The Independent Institute

http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=739

Daniel J. Smith
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http://www.danieljosephsmith.com


Strange Laws

http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/04/strange-law.html


POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj19n2/cj19n2-8.pdf


Corruption and Growth

http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj27n3/cj27n3-3.pdf

http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj27n3/cj27n3-2.pdf


Revenue Estimates from Tanning Tax are Half-Baked

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Revenue Estimates from Tanning Tax are Half-Baked


Ten Rules for Dealing with Police

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Ten Rules for Dealing with Police

Outstanding new film, premiered at the Cato Institute last week. Watch it here. Lots of useful advice for law-abiding citizens about how to properly exercise their rights to refuse searches that are not based on warrants or probable cause, and other efforts to trick citizens into waiving their rights.

http://www.cato.org/events/100212screening.html


EPA Testing

“ But this week the Government Accountability Office reported on its test of the EPA’s testing.

GAO obtained Energy Star certifications for 15 bogus products, including a gas-powered alarm clock.

Even worse: The GAO attached a feather duster to a space heater, sent the photo to the EPA, and got approval in just 11 days.”

“I can’t wait until they tell me which heart drug to take”

http://stossel.blogs.foxbusiness.com/2010/03/27/brilliant-government-testing/#ixzz0jfLDEExC


Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing? — by Lauren Cohen, Joshua D. Coval, Christopher Malloy

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Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing? — by Lauren Cohen, Joshua D. Coval, Christopher Malloy

This paper employs a new empirical approach for identifying the impact of government spending on the private sector. Our key innovation is to use changes in congressional committee chairmanship as a source of exogenous variation in state-level federal expenditures. In doing so, we show that fiscal spending shocks appear to significantly dampen corporate sector investment and employment activity. These corporate reactions follow both Senate and House committee chair changes, are present among large and small firms and within large and small states, are partially reversed when the congressman resigns, and are most pronounced among geographically-concentrated firms. The effects are economically meaningful and the mechanism – entirely distinct from the more traditional interest rate and tax channels – suggests new considerations in assessing the impact of government spending on private sector economic activity.

Daniel J. SmithSent Via Mobile Phone


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