More Gangs, Less Crime
Posted: September 7, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Private Police, Uncategorized Leave a comment »Sent to you via Google Reader
More Gangs, Less Crime
Superstition and Development
Posted: August 23, 2010 Filed under: Development Economics, Endogenous Rules, Uncategorized Leave a comment »Sent to you via Google Reader
Superstition and Development
Anarchy and Efficient Law – David Friedman
Posted: July 28, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism Leave a comment »http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Anarchy_and_Eff_Law/Anarchy_and_Eff_Law.html
Stateless in Somalia, by Benjamin Powell
Posted: July 15, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Uncategorized Leave a comment »Sent to you via Google Reader
Stateless in Somalia, by Benjamin Powell
A lecture by Professor Benjamin Powell on institutional development in Somalia. In this lecture he compares the government failure in Somalia with the spontaneous development of indigenous markets.
Daniel J. SmithSent Via Mobile Phone
http://www.danieljosephsmith.com
Let Fake States Fail: Anarchy as a Viable Solution to Artificial States
Posted: June 30, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Development Economics, Endogenous Rules Leave a comment »Exit, collective action and polycentric political systems
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://www.springerlink.com/content/p45563w500042q1m/
Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School’s important contributions include the development of the concept of “polycentric” political systems and the demonstration that solutions to common-pool resource problems may be solved voluntarily by rational individuals, even in situations that resemble Prisoners’ Dilemmas. The program, however, pays little attention to how individuals’ ability to exit may affect the interaction in Prisoners’ Dilemma-like situations, for worse or better. We argue why this is a worthwhile consideration and survey results from public choice and game theory.
Foundations of the Ostrom workshop: institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance of the commons
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://www.springerlink.com/content/38g0220845507614/
This paper highlights important lessons gained from the research program of Elinor Ostrom, and demonstrates the close connection between public choice and the work on collective management of the commons for which Lin was honored by the Nobel Prize committee. Although our primary focus is on Lin’s research on self-governance and the “commons,” an overarching goal is to capture the intellectual journey of participants in the Ostrom Workshop, who continue to be guided by the inspiring examples set by Lin and Vincent Ostrom.
Is the only form of ‘reasonable regulation’ self regulation?: Lessons from Lin Ostrom on regulating the commons and cultivating citizens
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://www.springerlink.com/content/m569086318336gx2/
Elinor Ostrom, the 2009 Nobel Prize winner in economic science, has made significant contributions throughout her career to the disciplines of political economy and public choice. This article focuses on her contributions to our understanding of how rules of self-governance can produce cooperation out of situations of conflict over resource use. Through the use of a multiple-methods approach to political economy, Ostrom has demonstrated in a variety of historical circumstances and within a diversity of institutional environments how individuals can craft rules so that they can live better together in their communities and realize the gains from social cooperation under the division of labor.
PROMISE: THE NEGLECTED OBLIGATION IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
Posted: May 22, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Polycentrism, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=7730604
The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa.
Posted: April 30, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://mises.org/journals/jls/21_2/21_2_7.pdf
Daniel J. Smith
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http://www.danieljosephsmith.com
DEMOCRACY AMERICA POSSIBILITIES IN AND THE LAW STATE FOR WITHOUT THE
Posted: April 30, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://mises.org/journals/jls/21_2/21_2_2.pdf
Daniel J. Smith
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http://www.danieljosephsmith.com
If Men Were Angels: The Basic Analytics of the State versus Self-Government
Posted: April 30, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Self-Regulation, Uncategorized Leave a comment »http://mises.org/journals/jls/21_4/21_4_7.pdf
Daniel J. Smith
Sent Via Mobile Phone
http://www.danieljosephsmith.com
The Market for Force: The Independent Review: The Independent Institute
Posted: April 27, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Police, Private Police, Uncategorized, War Leave a comment »http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=618
Daniel J. Smith
Sent Via Mobile Phone
www.danieljosephsmith.com
Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development
Posted: April 22, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Police Leave a comment »This paper examines the impact on agricultural development of the introduction of barbed wire fencing to the American Plains in the late nineteenth century. Without a fence, farmers risked uncompensated damage by others’ livestock. From 1880 to 1900, the introduction and near-universal adoption of barbed wire greatly reduced the cost of fences, relative to the predominant wooden fences, especially in counties with the least woodland. Over that period, counties with the least woodland experienced substantial relative increases in settlement, land improvement, land values, and the productivity and production share of crops most in need of protection. This increase in agricultural development appears partly to reflect farmers’ increased ability to protect their land from encroachment. States’ inability to protect this full bundle of property rights on the frontier, beyond providing formal land titles, might have otherwise restricted agricultural development.
New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution
Posted: April 22, 2010 Filed under: Endogenous Rules, Law Leave a comment »http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=7547808
The Law of Capitalism Vs. the Lawlessness of Politics
Posted: April 22, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Law, Reciprocity, Reputation, Uncategorized Leave a comment »Sent to you via Google Reader
The Law of Capitalism Vs. the Lawlessness of Politics
Public Safety through Private Action: An economic assessment of BIDs, locks, and citizen cooperation
Posted: April 14, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Private Police Leave a comment »“Given the central role of private individuals and firms in determining the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, and the quality and availability of criminal opportunities, private actions arguably deserve a central role in the analysis of crime and crime prevention policy. But the leading scholarly commentaries on the crime drop during the 1990s have largely ignored the role of the private sector, as have policymakers. Among the potentially relevant trends: growing reporting rates (documented in this paper); the growing sophistication and use of alarms, monitoring equipment and locks; the considerable increase in the employment of private security guards; and the decline in the use of cash. Private actions of this sort have the potential to both reduce crime rates and reduce arrests and imprisonment. Well-designed regulations and programs can encourage effective private action.
One creative method to harness private action to cost-effective crime control is the creation of business improvement districts (BIDs). Our quasi-experimental analysis of Los Angeles BIDs demonstrates that the social benefits of BID expenditures on security are a large multiple (about 20) of the private expenditures. Creation and operation of effective BIDs requires a legal infrastructure that helps neighborhoods solve the collective action problem.”
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w15877#fromrss
Anarchy and Efficient Law – David Friedman
Posted: April 2, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules Leave a comment »http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Anarchy_and_Eff_Law/Anarchy_and_Eff_Law.html
Enforcement and Compliance in Lima’s Street Markets The Origins and Consequences of Policy Incoherence toward Informal Traders
Posted: March 27, 2010 Filed under: Endogenous Rules, Property Rights, Regulation, Special Interest Groups Leave a comment »“Abstract
http://www.wider.unu.edu/stc/repec/pdfs/rp2005/rp2005-16.pdf
Violent conflicts and governance challenges in West Africa: the case of the Mano River basin area
Posted: March 26, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Corruption, Democracy, Development Economics, Economic Freedom, Endogenous Rules, Peace, War Leave a comment »“The Mano River basin area has become a conflict zone, in which state failure and violence in Liberia has spread to Sierra Leone and the forest region of Guinea. This article traces the origins of the conflicts to governance failures in all three states, and analyses their incorporation into a single conflict system, orchestrated especially through the entrepreneurial abilities and ambitions of Charles Taylor. Peace settlements negotiated to end the violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone failed, both because of the misconceived power-sharing formula that they embodied, and because they failed to take account of the complex linkages between conflicts across the basin area. The way forward lies in a multilevel basin-wide approach, which seeks to move beyond the failed formula of attempting to reconstitute state power, in favour of constructing institutions of accountable democratic governance at multiple levels from the local level to the regional level and beyond.”
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=240015
Ethnic Business Networks
Posted: March 26, 2010 Filed under: Culture, Development Economics, Endogenous Rules, Reciprocity, Reputation Leave a comment »http://aidwatchers.com/2010/03/gujarati-hotels-and-chaldean-liquor-stores/
Private Police Articles from European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research
Posted: March 24, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Private Police Leave a comment »http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/crim/1999/00000007/00000002;jsessionid=18ksvruuofml0.alice
Powers and Accountability of Private Police
Posted: March 24, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Private Police Leave a comment »“Substantial growth in private policing has been documented in countries throughout the world, and the division of responsibilities for policing between public and private authorities has become increasingly blurred and contested during the last three decades. Because private policing is so frequently assessed on the basis of criteria established with respect to the public police, substantial myths have developed about the powers and accountability of private police; specifically, it is commonly asserted that private police have no significant power(s), and are essentially not accountable, in comparison with the public police. The author argues that such assertions misrepresent the very substantial coercive power of private police as well as the variety of mechanisms through which they may be held accountable, and also commonly exaggerate the effective accountability of the public police. The author concludes that a greater appreciation of the actual power and accountability of private police will provide an improved basis for the development of sound public policy with respect to both private and public policing, and with respect to appropriate relationships between private and public policing organisations.”
http://www.springerlink.com/content/t2h6032u55140514/
Private Security: Implications for Social Control
Posted: March 24, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Private Police Leave a comment »http://www.jstor.org/pss/800267
Private Security and Public Policing
Posted: March 24, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Private Police Leave a comment »Diversification of British policing: The citizen experience
Posted: March 24, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Private Police Leave a comment »“This paper considers how increasing privatisation of policing in the UK impacts on citizens in a residential community. It reports on an evaluation of the activities of a private security company and the perceptions of the local community of the impact and effectiveness of the scheme. It considers how the presence of the private guards influences community safety and individuals’ reported fear of crime. It also explores the extent to which the private company’s style of policing is to target particular individuals, thereby jeopardising individual rights and civil liberties. Finally, the paper discusses the extent to which the presence of the guards reinforces social exclusion at the community level.”
‘Household Security’: Private Policing and Vigilantism in Doncaster
Posted: March 24, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Private Police Leave a comment »“The extension of private security patrols into public spaces has increased considerably in recent years and both the government and the police service have indicated a willingness to seek ways to accommodate and regulate private security companies. This article presents the results of a study into the operation of one private security company in a working-class area in the North of England. It examines some of the difficulties that will be faced by the police, the formal agents of law and order in attempting to regulate private security firms and highlights the motivation of ordinary citizens faced by increasing fear of crime. At the same time it allows us to challenge some earlier assumptions about the nature of vigilantism and suggests a modification of Johnson’s 1996 definition.”
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119041599/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0
Reciprocity, Altruism and the Civil Society: In Praise of Heterogeneity
Posted: March 19, 2010 Filed under: Endogenous Rules, Morals, Reciprocity Leave a comment »Evolution of Cooperation and Altruism Among Robots
Posted: March 16, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Evolution, Morals, Spontaneous Order Leave a comment »“Here, we describe selected studies of experimental evolution with robots to illustrate how the process of natural selection can lead to the evolution of complex traits such as adaptive behaviours. Just a few hundred generations of selection are sufficient to allow robots to evolve collision-free movement, homing, sophisticated predator versus prey strategies, coadaptation of brains and bodies, cooperation, and even altruism.”
“In all cases, robots initially exhibited completely uncoordinated behaviour because their genomes had random values. However, a few hundreds of generations of random mutations and selective reproduction were sufficient to promote the evolution of efficient behaviours in a wide range of environmental conditions. The ability of robots to orientate, escape predators, and even cooperate is particularly remarkable given that they had deliberately simple genotypes directly mapped into the connection weights of neural networks comprising only a few dozen neurons.”
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1000292
Emergent Order Sighting
Posted: March 14, 2010 Filed under: Anarchy, Endogenous Rules, Spontaneous Order Leave a comment »http://divisionoflabour.com/archives/006928.php