Jack Abramoff: The lobbyist’s playbook

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57319075/jack-abramoff-the-lobbyists-playbook/


Corporate PACs give heavily to Democrats

http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/nearly-5-workers-for-every-available-job/


A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis — by Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, Thierry Tressel

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A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis — by Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, Thierry Tressel

Has lobbying by financial institutions contributed to the financial crisis? This paper uses detailed information on financial institutions’ lobbying and mortgage lending activities to answer this question. We find that lobbying was associated with more risk-taking during 2000-07 and with worse outcomes in 2008. In particular, lenders lobbying more intensively on issues related to mortgage lending and securitization (i) originated mortgages with higher loan-to-income ratios, (ii) securitized a faster growing proportion of their loans, and (iii) had faster growing originations of mortgages. Moreover, delinquency rates in 2008 were higher in areas where lobbying lenders’ mortgage lending grew faster. These lenders also experienced negative abnormal stock returns during the rescue of Bear Stearns and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but positive abnormal returns when the bailout was announced. Finally, we find a higher bailout probability for lobbying lenders. These findings suggest that lending by politically active lenders played a role in accumulation of risks and thus contributed to the financial crisis.


Top All-Time Donors, 1989-2010

http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/list.php?type=A


One of Obama’s Biggest Donors Now His ‘Economics Adviser’ – Publius Forum

http://www.chicagonow.com/blogs/publius-forum/2011/01/one-of-obamas-biggest-donors-now-his-economics-adviser.html

 


For food-safety overhaul, lobbyists rushed to the table

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/03/AR2010120306058.html


Everyone Hates Ethanol Subsidies. Why Can’t We Get Rid of Them?

http://reason.com/blog/2010/12/10/everyone-hates-ethanol-subsidi


United States Department of Agriculture, Domino’s Pizza and Anti-Obesity

Dairy Management, which has made cheese its cause, is not a private business consultant. It is a marketing creation of the United States Department of Agriculture — the same agency at the center of a federal anti-obesity drive that discourages over-consumption of some of the very foods Dairy Management is vigorously promoting.

http://jeffreymiron.com/2010/11/one-more-reason-to-avoid-dominos-pizza/


Friends in High Places — by Lauren Cohen, Christopher Malloy

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Friends in High Places — by Lauren Cohen, Christopher Malloy

 


Cheap Booze, Cheaper Congressmen

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Cheap Booze, Cheaper Congressmen


This Bud’s Not for You

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This Bud’s Not for You

(Jonathan H. Adler)

The California Beer and Beverage Distributors is opposing a California ballot proposition that would legalize marijuana within the state. No surprise there. Some of the CBBD’s members may fear legal marijuana would compete with beer. Interestingly, the CBBD claims it is not opposed to legalization in principle, just the poor wording of this specific proposal. Josh Wright doesn’t buy it. Neither should you.

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Daniel J. SmithSent Via Mobile Phone
http://www.danieljosephsmith.com


For Lobbyists, How Much Is a Senate Connection Worth?

http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/for-lobbyists-how-much-is-a-senate-connection-worth/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+FreakonomicsBlog+(Freakonomics+Blog)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2XLuaebpdAA


The Effects of Earmarks on the Likelihood of Reelection

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1608230


Interest Groups, Information Manipulation in the Media, and Public Policy: The Case of the Landless Peasants Movement in Brazil

“We extend the literature on interest group behavior and policy outcomes by examining how groups with limited resources (votes and campaign contributions) effectively influence government by manipulating media information to voters. Voters in turn lobby politicians to implement the group’s preferred policies. In this manner interest groups can secure favorable government actions beyond their size and wealth. This is an important contribution because of the increased role of the media in the information age and because this linkage better explains observed government policies. We develop a multi-principal, multi-task model of interest group behavior and generate the characteristics of interest groups that would be most successful using publicity to secure their policy objectives. We apply the model to the Landless Peasants’ Movement in Brazil. We detail how the Landless Peasants’ Movement molds information; show the general voter response; and examine the reaction of politicians in changing the timing and nature of policy.”

http://papers.nber.org/papers/w15865#fromrss


Gigantism in Lawmaking

http://thinkmarkets.wordpress.com/2010/03/30/gigantism-in-lawmaking/


Health Care and Lobbying

http://reason.com/blog/2010/03/17/more-on-big-pharmas-bill?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+reason/HitandRun+(Reason+Online+-+Hit+%26+Run+Blog)&utm_content=Google+Reader


“When buying and selling are controlled by legislation, the first things to be bought and sold are legislators” — P.J. O’Rourke.


Political Influence behind the Veil of Peer Review: An Analysis of Public Biomedical Research Funding in the United States

http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/605565

The U.S. public biomedical research system is renowned for its peer review process that awards federal funds to meritorious research performers. Although congressional appropriators do not earmark federal funds for biomedical research performers, I argue that they support allocations for those research fields that are most likely to benefit performers in their constituencies. Such disguised transfers mitigate the reputational penalties to appropriators of interfering with a merit‐driven system. I use data on all peer‐reviewed grants by the National Institutes of Health during the years 1984–2003 and find that performers in the states of certain House Appropriations Committee members receive 5.9–10.3 percent more research funds than those at unrepresented institutions. The returns to representation are concentrated in state universities and small businesses. Members support funding for the projects of represented performers in fields in which they are relatively weak and counteract the distributive effect of the peer review process.


Under Obama’s Watch, Lobbyists Keep On Keepin’ On

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Under Obama’s Watch, Lobbyists Keep On Keepin’ On


Automobile “Safety” Inspections Research

http://www.jstor.org/pss/30027176

http://www.jstor.org/pss/30025852

http://www.jstor.org/pss/2487049


What a Wise Mother Would Wish Her Children to Do For a Living if ObamaCare Passes

What a Wise Mother Would Wish Her Children to Do For a Living if ObamaCare Passes


Political lobbying explained through the example of all-pay auctions

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QN_kt97w7Wg&feature=player_embedded#

HT: Marginal Revolution


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