Constraining the state’s ability to employ force: the standing army debates, 1697–99

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=7666696

Britain’s Glorious Revolution of 1688 is one of the most widely studied cases of institutional change. Recent institutional analyses of the Glorious Revolution, however, have failed to address one of the central issues in political science: control of the state’s comparative advantage in violence. This paper examines this issue through analysis of the standing army debates of the late 1690s. Participants in the debates disputed whether a standing army or a militia would be the most effective institutional arrangement to guard against threats from abroad and tyranny at home. Both sides of the debate analyzed the effects of a standing army in terms of the incentives that it created for soldiers, citizens, the monarch, and foreign governments.


Privately Funded and Built U.S. Warships in the Quasi-War of 1797–1801: The Independent Review: The Independent Institute

http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=646

Daniel J. Smith
Sent Via Mobile Phone
http://www.danieljosephsmith.com


Military Spending/Gross Domestic Product = Nonsense for Budget Policymaking: The Independent Review: The Independent Institute

http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=701

Daniel J. Smith
Sent Via Mobile Phone
http://www.danieljosephsmith.com


National Defense is Not a Public Good

http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2009/10/a_simple_proof.html


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