Caplan: Philosophy and Rational Irrationality
Posted: December 14, 2009 Filed under: Methodology, Philosophy, Rationality Leave a comment »http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2009/12/philosophy_and.html
“(1) Principle of Epistemic Rationality: (PER)- It is not epistemically rational to believe something just because it is interesting, original, or controversial.
(2) Publishability Fact: (PF)- In order to get regularly published in philosophy, you need to be able to say things that are interesting, original, and controversial.
(3) Perverse Incentives: (PI)-The practice of philosophy incentivizes non-rational motives of belief formation; specifically, it incentivizes believing things that are interesting, original, and controversial whether or not they are true. (4) Sad Truth: (ST)- Almost all claims that are interesting, original, and controversial are false. (5) Unfortunate Conclusion: (UC)- The practice of philosophy encourages philosophers to believe and to publish things that are false.”
