Why ‘Caylee’s Law’ Is A Bad Idea
Posted: July 11, 2011 Filed under: Forensic Science, Punishment Leave a comment »http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/11/caylees-law-casey-anthony-_n_893953.html?ref=fb&src=sp
US has highest population prison rate in the world
Posted: January 30, 2010 Filed under: Prison, Punishment Leave a comment »http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1764
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation
Posted: January 20, 2010 Filed under: Cooperation, Game Theory, Punishment Leave a comment »Abstract
Costly punishment can facilitate cooperation in public-goods games, as human subjects will incur costs to punish non-cooperators even in settings where it is unlikely that they will face the same opponents again. Understanding when and why it occurs is important both for the design of economic institutions and for modeling the evolution of cooperation. Our experiment shows that subjects will engage in costly punishment even when it will not be observed until the end of the session, which supports the view that agents enjoy punishment. Moreover, players continue to cooperate when punishment is unobserved, perhaps because they (correctly) anticipate that shirkers will be punished: Fear of punishment can be as effective at promoting contributions as punishment itself.
Criminal Recidivism after Prison and Electronic Monitoring — by Rafael Di Tella, Ernesto Schargrodsky
Posted: December 28, 2009 Filed under: Courts, Crime, Prison, Punishment, Uncategorized 1 Comment »Sent to you via Google Reader
Criminal Recidivism after Prison and Electronic Monitoring — by Rafael Di Tella, Ernesto Schargrodsky
We study the re-arrest rates for two groups: individuals formerly in prison and individuals formerly under electronic monitoring (EM). We find that the recidivism rate of former prisoners is 22% while that for those a€treated’ with electronic monitoring is 13% (40% lower). We convince ourselves that the estimates are causal using peculiarities of the Argentine setting. For example, we have almost as much information as the judges have when deciding on the allocation of EM; the program is rationed to only some offenders; and some institutional features (such as bad prison conditions) convert ideological differences across judges (to which detainees are randomly matched) into very large differences in the allocation of electronic monitoring.
Daniel J. SmithSent Via Mobile Phone
