You Worry. You Shouldn’t. Part 1: Overpopulation and Resource Exhaustion
Posted: June 15, 2012 Filed under: Population, Resource Curse Leave a comment »The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey
Posted: April 5, 2010 Filed under: Development Economics, Resource Curse Leave a comment »“It is striking how often countries with oil or other natural resource wealth have failed to grow more rapidly than those without. This is the phenomenon known as the Natural Resource Curse. The principle has been borne out in some econometric tests of the determinants of economic performance across a comprehensive sample of countries. This paper considers six aspects of commodity wealth, each of interest in its own right, but each also a channel that some have suggested could lead to sub-standard economic performance. They are: long-term trends in world commodity prices, volatility, crowding out of manufacturing, civil war, poor institutions, and the Dutch Disease. Skeptics have questioned the Natural Resource Curse, pointing to examples of commodity-exporting countries that have done well and arguing that resource endowments and booms are not exogenous. The paper concludes with a consideration of institutions and policies that some commodity-producers have tried, in efforts to overcome the pitfalls of the Curse. Ideas include indexation of oil contracts, hedging of export proceeds, denomination of debt in terms of oil, Chile-style fiscal rules, a monetary target that emphasizes product prices, transparent commodity funds, and lump-sum distribution.”
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w15836#fromrss
Reversal of Fortunes
Posted: March 24, 2010 Filed under: Institutions, Private Property, Resource Curse Leave a comment »http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~jrobins/researchpapers/publishedpapers/jr_ROFQJEversion.pdf
Resources, conflict and development choices: public good provision in resource rich economies
Posted: March 24, 2010 Filed under: Corruption, Development Economics, Government, Resource Curse Leave a comment »“Natural resource wealth can be a curse or a blessing for a country. This paper hypothesises that the provision of productive public goods (or lack of it) is a pathway that helps understand these different outcomes when policy choices are made under the threat of conflict inherent in resource-rich countries. Facing potential conflict over resources, a self-interested ruler may choose to invest in either military repression or in productive public goods—physical and social infrastructure. While both measures aim at preventing conflict, we show theoretically that the optimal policy choice depends on the relative effectiveness of the ruler and the population in contesting the resources. Increased resource wealth provides a disincentive to invest in development if the ruler is more effective than the population in appropriating the resources. Conversely, if the ruler is relatively ineffective, more resource wealth induces higher levels of public goods. We present empirical evidence consistent with the predictions of the model for a sample of 57 countries over three decades. Thus, we provide and test empirically a conditional resource curse theory, postulating that the relative effectiveness of the contenders plays a crucial role in determining whether resources are a curse or a blessing.”
http://www.springerlink.com/content/k748q1128676j574/
